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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
AMY P. JOHN"SOX, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
-vs.-
WILLIAM T. MAYNARD, 
Defendant and Respondent. 
NATURE OF CASE 
This is an intersection case. We think it proper to 
make a few preliminary observations which must be con-
sidered by this court in arriving at a cle.ar solution of the 
various points argued by appellant. 
The trial court submitted the case to a jury on a 
general verdict. No request for .a special verdict or for 
answers to special interrogatories was proposed by either 
plaintiff or defendant. The jury returned a verdict in 
favor of defendant. In the case of, 
Horsley vs. Robin son 
112 Utah 227 
186 P. 2nd, 592 
this court says : 
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"Under a general verdict we cannot be assured 
what facts the jury found or that they found the 
facts necessary to sustain their verdict. So it is 
universally held under the common law system, 
as it must be, in order to give stability to jury ver-
dict, that the appellate court must sustain the 
verdict where the evidence is sufficient to support 
a finding of the necessary facts to do so." 
If, therefore, there was evidence upon which the jury 
could find either: 
(a) That defendant was not negligent, he being 
the driver of an emergency vehicle respond-
ing to an emergency call; or 
(b) That, if the plaintiff was herself guilty of 
contributory negligence contributing proxi-
mately to her injury, then this court cannot 
set aside the verdict. 
Furthermore, this being an action at law under the re-
peated decisions of this court, an appellate court must 
view the evidence in its most favorable aspect to support 
the general verdict which the jury has rendered. See, 
Horsley vs. Robin son, Supra 
Pixton vs. Dunn 
120 Utah 658 
238 P. 2nd, 408 
"The trial court, at the conclusion of the case, 
elected to accept as true the evidence presented by 
respondent and to reject as untrue that introduced 
by appellant. That disposes of this issue because 
this being an action at law, the appellate court is 
powerless to substitute another evaluation of the 
evidence for that of the trial court where such 
evidenee wa~ <'onflicting." 
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says, 
Sine vs. Salt Lake Transportation Company 
106 Utah 289 
147 P. 2nd, 875 
"This is a case at law. It, therefore, follows 
that this appeal is upon questions of law alone. 
That being true, the function of this court is not 
to pass upon the weight of the evidence nor to 
determine conflicts therein, but to examine it 
solely for the purpose of determining whether or 
not the judgment finds substantial support in the 
evidence. In so examining the evidence, all reason-
able presumptions are in favor of the trial court's 
findings and judgment and the wl;idence must 
be considered in the light most favorable to them." 
Gibbs vs. Blue Cab, Inc. 
122 Utah 312 
249 P. 2nd, 213 
":Matters of negligence, contributory negli-
gence and proximate cause generally are jury 
questions unless evidentiary facts are of such 
conclusive character as to require all reasonable 
minds to conclude that ultimate fact of negligence, 
contributory negligence or proximate cause does 
or does not exist." 
In fact, the courts in many jurisdirtions are now pretty 
well committed to the doctrine that contributory negli-
gence is in nearly every case a question of fact to be sub-
mitted to the jury. We shall merely ei te a few of these 
cases, which are legion: 
Hancock vs. Thejfin 
Oklahoma 
256 P. 2nd, 428 
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Shelton vs. Lowell 
Oregon 
249 P. 2nd, 958 
Hines vs. Neuner 
Washington 
253 P. 2nd, 942 
Borgia vs. Anselmi 
Wyoming 
258 P. 2nd, 796 
Counsel has fallen into the error so frequently in-
dulged in, in this, that in his statement of facts, counsel 
has referred to the evidence in the light most favorable 
to the appellant rather than in the light most favorable 
to the defendant. We contend that judging the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the respondent that the 
following facts are deducible from the evidence: 
At the time of the accident defendant was a policeman 
en1ployed in the Traffic Department of Ogden City. He 
was driving a 1954 Ford automobile owned by Ogden 
City which was equipped with a revolving red light on its 
top and a siren near the left front. This equip1nent com-
plied with the statutory regulations required for emer-
gency vehicles. Tr. 332 to 335. Immediately preceding 
the .accident, defendant was driving said automobile 
~orthward on Washington Boulevard in the outside lane 
at about twenty five 1uiles per hour. He was follo"\\i.ng 
two cars. \Yhen he was between twenty eighth and twenty 
ninth streets he turned on his radio which pern1itted him 
to eommunicate with the dispatcher at police head-
quarters. (He described the intercon1n1unicating system 
''Pr. 334). \Vhen he was just South of twenty eighth street 
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he began his conversation with the dispatcher who was 
then calling the ambulance. The dispatcher called for car 
fourteen (not defendant's car) and then he asked for .a 
10-20, which means the station is asking for your location. 
By this time defendant had just passed Rigo's Cafe on the 
North side of twenty eighth street. Defendant gave his 
location as .approaching twenty seventh street. The dis-
patcher then told defendant to assist car fourteen at a 
fatal accident on twenty fifth and :Monroe, whereupon 
defendant started to pick up speed. He was still on the 
outside lane. Tr. 336-337. He then started to swing into 
the inner lane to pass the cars in front. Defendant was 
then opposite the Lynada Motel. ( ~ee Plaintiff's Exhibit 
"A" for location and measured distances of various points 
to the point of the accident.) 
Defendant turned on the red light and the ;-;iren as 
soon as the dispatcher told him to assist car fourteen. 
(NOTE: This record was played and replayed nurnerous 
times to the jury. It discloses that at the instant the dis-
patcher told defendant to assist car fourteen, the siren 
was kicked on by defendant. Tr. 340.) 
Defendant removed his foot off the ~ 1 n•n button to 
push his clutch in as he shifted inio ~c·('(Jild gear to pick 
up speed and as he was turning into the inside lane he 
then hit the siren button as soon as he hacl finished shift-
ing. At that time he was by the bank. At Llmt time he 
was travelling between thirty .and thirty five miles per 
hour. The speedometer on this car was placed in an ele-
vated position so that he could glance at his speed without 
lowering his head. It was raining a little at the time. 
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'rhere was no south bound traffic on W .ashington Boule-
vard, so that the entire West half was entirely unobstruct-
ed. Its width is shown to be forty two feet from center 
to curb. He could see the intersection of twenty seventh 
street to the West. He looked to the West and saw no 
cars, either in the intersection or approaching the inter-
:section. However, he was more concerned about cars 
corning from the right which would be West bound down 
twenty seventh because of cars proceeding Northward 
on the outside l.ane and the Ogden Ford Sales sign on the 
Southeast corner of the intersection which obstructed 
his view of West bound automobiles. He looked to his 
left and saw that that was clear. He then looked to the 
East and glanced at his speedometer because he was keep-
ing his car below forty miles per hour. He then glanced 
up straight .ahead and the Johnson car was directly in 
front of him. At that time his speedometer read thirty 
seven rniles per hour. 
Defendant was instructed by his superior officer that 
where an ambulance had been called that we were to pro-
ceed on an emergency basis. Defendant turned on the red 
lights and siren when he was opposite the Browning used 
e.a r lot South of the bank and he continued from there to 
the point of the accident with his red light burning and 
his :siren sounding. The distance to the bank is shown on 
plaintiff's Exhibit "A." There were no obstructions of 
any kind to interfere with the plaintiff's view so that as 
Hhe proceeded into the intersection and toward the center 
Hhe had a clear and unobstructed view of the en1ergency 
vehiele proceeding N" orthw.ard on the inside lane for a 
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distance of one hundred eighty feet frmn the South curb 
line on twenty seventh to the North line of the bank build-
ing. The point of contact, however, was nineteen feet 
North of the South curb line of twenty seventh street, 
so that the defendant's emergency vehicle travelled a total 
distance of at least two hundred feet with the siren 
sounding and the revolving light lighted. 
No one saw the plaintiff enter the intersection. The 
witness Cox was standing on the South side of his car 
which was parked at the curb approximately one hundred 
nineteen feet South of the point of contact. He state8 
that when the defendant's vehicle passed him, the siren 
was sounding and the lights were burning. He then looked 
up and saw plaintiff's car which was then near the center 
of the intersection. He estimates that it was travelling 
from five to seven miles per hour and that it travelled 
approximately six feet East of the semaphore light where 
it was struck. See Tr. 131 to 146. The only other witnesH 
who saw the plaintiff's car before the accident was 
Howard Clay whose car was parked in front of the Com-
munity Bakery. He stated that after the patrol car had 
passed him, he looked to the North anu noticed the plain-
tiff's automobile proceeding East .across tilt> intersection 
travelling not less than five miles per hour hut not more 
than seven miles per hour to his best judgment. Tr. 113. 
However, he does not attempt to point out where the 
Johnson car was when he first saw it, or how far it had 
proceeded into the intersection. 
The jury, therefore, had a right to infer that the 
plaintiff proceeded into the intersection and through the 
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\Vest half of W .ashington Boulevard travelling at a speed 
of between five and seven miles per hour; that her view 
was unobstructed and there was nothing to prevent her 
seeing the automobile., or hearing the siren. 
In judging whether or not there was sufficient evi-
dence to go to the jury on the question of plaintiff's con-
tributory negligence, we desire to call the court's atten-
tion to the case of, 
Hickoff vs. Skinner 
113 Utah 1 
190 P. 2nd 51-! 
While this case does not involve an emergency vehicle, it 
is a so-called intersection case and to that extent supports 
our position that on this evidence the jury could find that 
even though the defendant was guilty of negligence, yet 
the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence barring 
her right of recovery. \Ve shall take the liberty of quot-
ing from this case. The court, speaking through Mr. 
Justice Latimer, says: 
"Plaintiff had an unobstructed view the full 
length of the block to the East. Defendant's speed, 
according to what defendant told the investigating 
officers, was 45 mph, the posted speed limit for 
that street being 35 mph. There were no skid 
1narks before the impact occurred. Plaintiff, not 
having seen defendant's car after the first observa-
tion of it, made no attempt to avoid .a collision, 
and defendant made little, if any, effort to prevent 
the hnpact." 
"Under these facts the trial court found the 
plaintiff to have been guilty of contributory negli-
geneP as a. n1atter of law. and .accordingly entered 
a judgment of nonsuit." 
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"Granted that the defendant should have 
yielded the right of way, that does not absolve 
plaintiff of negligence for his prolonged inatten-
tion to the traffic that w.as approaching West on 
21st South." 
"The scope of. plaintiff's vision would have 
permitted him to have seen the automobile ap-
proaching without the necessity of turning his 
head completely around to the right. The time 
element, even if it were less than is shown by 
the evidence, was such that a reasonably prudent 
.and careful person would have looked to the East 
several times while traversing the diHtance from 
the stop sign to the point of collision. One look 
to the East before crossing the center line of 21st 
South Street would have disclosed to the plaintiff 
that he was about to enter the path of a rapidly 
moving vehicle, and. that if he·continued forward, 
a collision of the two vehicles would most likely 
occur. Furthermore, .at the relatively slow speed 
plaintiff was travelling, he could easily have made 
an immediate stop in time to have avoided the 
collision which did take pla('e." 
Quoting from the Bullock vs. Luke case, which lays 
down. the following rule : 
"regardless of which driver is terhnically en-
titled to the right of w.ay, both operators must 
use due care and caution in proceeding into and 
across intersections. * * • * there should be placed 
on both the burden to keep a proper lookout and 
to use reasonable care to avoid a collision. Neither 
should be permitted to close his· eyes to other 
vehicles which he knows or has reason to believe 
are .approaching, simply because a state statute 
or municipal ordinance designates him the pre-
ferred driver. The rights of drivers approaching 
and crossing intersections are r<'lative. Both 
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drivers have the duties of being heedful and of 
maintaining a proper lookout. Plaintiff was 
neglectful in both particulars, and no jury could 
reasonably find that he was not negligent. * * • • 
It is not unusual for drivers crossing a wide 
arterial highway such as this to proceed across 
the near half of the street and then stop or come 
to a near stop near the middle to permit the pas-
sage of through traffic on the other half. The 
evidence having established 45 mph as the speed 
of defendant's car, his opportunity to avoid the 
collision would be extremely limited." 
In our case, the court did not rule as a matter of 
law that the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negli-
gence but he submitted this issue to the jury under proper 
instructions. It is difficult for us to understand how, 
in the face of this record, it could be argued that the 
rourt could have instructed the jury that as a matter 
of law the plaintiff was not guilty of contributory negli-
gence. To have done so would have constituted reversible 
error. 
If the jury found from the evidence, as they might 
well have done, that plaintiff was proceeding Easterly 
through the intersection at a speed of five miles per hour 
and the defendant was travelling K orthward at a speed 
or thirty seven miles per hour, defendant would be 
travelling 7.4 times as fast as plaintiff. Therefore, while 
defendant was travelling approximately 220 feet ( dist-
ance testified to by defendant) with light burning and 
siren sounding, plaintiff would have to travel 30 feet 
in order that both cars could reach the point of impact 
at. the same time. Officer Bennett testified that a car 
10 
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travelling five miles per hour can be stopped in 6.538 
feet, which includes reaction time. Tr. 172-173. The jury 
could therefore conclude that plaintiff travelled thirty 
feet through the West half of ''T ashington Boulevard 
while the emergency car was approaching with its lights 
flashing and siren sounding, a situation very similar to 
the facts in the 
Hickok vs. Skinner case 
Cited Supra 
absent, however, the question of the emergency vehicle 
rule. 
Appellant suggests that there was a light sprinkle 
of rain falling. Certainly a slight rain could not inter-
fere or impede the sound of the siren and if the sky 
was overcast and stormy this would .add to and not 
detract from plaintiff's ability to observe the revolving 
red light. Yet, in the face of these facts, plaintiff drove 
slowly through the intersection and passed the center 
semaphore six feet where she was struck, llflhrithstand-
ing the obvious fact that she could have stopped bei'on• 
reaching the center, or she could have huT <>d either to 
her right or left, inasmuch as no traffic was moving 
on the West half of Washington Boulevard, and thereby 
could have avoided the accident. 
In the face of this record, we find it difficult to 
understand how appellant can contend that J>laintiff was 
not guilty of contributory negligence as a 1r.atter of law. 
Was the defendant guilty of negligence as a matter 
of law~ This question involves a consideration of the 
11 
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law applicable to emergency vehicles and is tied in with 
appellant's statement of Point Number Two with respect 
to the giving of instructions five and six. The so-called 
emergency exemption was formerly found in Section 
-:l-1-6-14, U.C.A., at which time the law provided: 
"C. The driver of an authorized emergency 
vehicle may: 
1. Park or stand irrespective of the pro-
visions of this Act, 
2. Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop 
sign, but only after slowing down as may 
be necessary for safe operation. 
However, the legislature repealed this act and adopted 
an entirely new act, which became effective in 1955, and 
this act excludes the provision contained in two, supra, 
which requires a slow down as may be necessary for s.afe 
operation. Under the 1955 Act, there is no requirement 
for an emergency vehicle to slow down when approaching 
an intersection. The 1955 Act further repeals practically 
all of the traffi~ rules and regulations which .are appli-
cable to other drivers upon the highway, so that we 
have a situation where the driver of an e1nergency vehicle 
under the 1955 Act is relieved of obeying every traffic 
rule and regulation set forth in the statute under traffic 
rules .and regulations. 
Starting with Article Two, Section 41-6-11, up to and 
including 4-1-6-159. We contend that the effect of the 
1955 Act relating to emergency vehicles relieved the 
driver of an emergency vehicle from obeying all traffic 
rules and regulations applicable to other drivers and 
12 
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the act imposed upon the driver of an emergency vehicle 
the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of .all 
persons, a term presently to be considered, and shall not 
relieve the driver from the consequences of an arbitrary 
exercise of the privileges declared in this section. The 
perplexing problem is how can the driver of an authorized 
emergency vehicle be excused or exonerated from obeying 
each and all of the traffic regulations which are imposed 
upon other drivers and yet drive with due regard for 
the safety of all persons. The Supreme Court of the 
State of California was confronted with this problem in 
the case of, 
Reed vs. Simpson 
196 P. 2nd, 895 
and in discussing this problem the court says: 
"But as plaintiffs maintain, such duty does 
not impose the same quantum of care upon the 
driver of an emergency vehicle a~ upon motorist~ 
generally for, in that event, the requirement would 
have the absurd result of practically nullifying 
the traffic exemption expressly granted by the sec-
tion. If the driver of an emergency vehicle is at 
all times required to drive with due regard for 
the safety of the public as all other drivers are 
required to do, then all the provisions of these 
statutes relating to emergency vehicles become 
meaningless and no privileges are granted to them, 
but, if his due regard for the safety of others 
means that he should by warning give others 
.a reasonable opportunity to yield the right of 
way, the statute becomes workable for the pur-
pose intended." 
13 
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And the court concludes that a fair interpretation of 
the emergency statute is that the driver of an emergency 
vehicle, when responding to an emergency, is only re-
quired to give, by suitable warning, a reasonable oppor-
tunity to yield the right of way and that the standard 
of care imposed upon such driver is that he must not 
be guilty of an arbitrary exercise of the privileges em-
braced in the exemption. 
It is to be noted that the Reed vs. Simpson case 
w.as decided by the Supreme Court of California under 
date of August 24, 1948 and that our present statute 
was enacted in 1955, or some seven years after the Cali-
fornia decision. We think that Instruction Number Five 
is a correct statement of the law as it applies to all 
drivers of motor vehicles upon the public highway of 
this state, limited only by the provisions which relate 
to emerg·ency vehicles. In the more difficult question 
related to the giving of a proper instruction relating 
to the duty of a driver of an emergency vehicle, the 
court undertook to do this in Instruction Xumber Six. 
Form Number 25.1 in the Utah Forms was clearly framed 
under the law as it existed prior to 1955 and as inter-
preted by this court in the case of, 
.Jensen vs. Taylor 
271 P. 2nd, 838 
2 Utah 2nd, 196 
whieh was decided on June 11, 1954, or before the enact-
Inent of the Act of 1955 and clearly cannot apply to the 
Aet of 1955 because the suggested forn1 contains the 
following language: 
14 
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"2. Proceed past a red or stop signal or stop 
sign but in doing so must slow down and proceed 
with due caution for the safety of the others." 
As we have previously pointed out, this duty to slow 
down and proceed with due c.aution for the safety of 
others is not found in the 1955 emergency act. The court, 
therefore, accepted the form of instruction suggested 
under California Jury Instructions, Volume II, com-
mencing at Page 810, which contains an elaborate note 
on the California decisions and then, at Page 814, Form 
215-A, sets out an .approved forrn of instruction which 
the courts of California have approved under statutes 
similar or almost identical with the 1955 act. And after 
the court, rather fully we think, advised the jury as 
to the duties and responsibilities of the driver of an 
emergency vehicle and defining c.arefully the meaning 
of the term: 
"Consequences of an arbitr.ary exercise of the 
privileges declared in the act." 
then proceeds to summarize in the final concluding para-
graph as follows: 
"It is for you to determine !'rom all of the 
evidence in the case whether or not the plaintiff 
has proved to your satisfaction, from a preponder-
ance of the evidence, that the defendant, when 
.approaching said intersection faiJ e(l f o drive said 
emergency vehicle in due regard for the safety 
of all persons, including the ]Jlaintiff, or whether 
the defendant was guilty of an arbitraty exercise 
of the privileges granted him by reason of the law 
as stated above." 
15 
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The court, therefore, submitted to the jury for its 
consideration two problems: 
1. Whether or not the defendant, when approach-
ing the intersection, failed to drive said emer-
gency vehicle in due regard for the safety of 
all persons, including the plaintiff; and 
2. Whether the defendant was guilty of .an arbi-
trary exercise of the privileges granted him by 
reason of the law as stated above. 
Incidentally, the court's definition of liability for 
arbitrary exercise of privileges is practically identical 
with the Utah Form Number 25.10. 
We think th.at Instructions Number Five and Six, 
when construed together, is a correct statement of the 
law as now contained in the 1955 Act. We further con-
tend that no prejudicial error was committed by the 
court in the giving of these instructions. 
Furthermore, we again revert to the proposition 
already discussed, and that is, that if the jury could 
have found that the plaintiff was herself guilty of con-
tributory negligence, then the verdict n1ust stand and 
the giving of this instruction, even though erroneous, 
would not be prejudicial. vVe, of course, do not admit 
by this statement that the Instruction Number Six is 
t:>rroneous. 
In view of the fact that appellant relies upon the 
Jensen vs. Taylor case, rited supra, we think it necessary 
to discuss this case more in detail. Justice \Y orthen, in 
writing the opinion for this rourt, sa~~s: 
16 
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"Defendant cites and relies on a line of Cali-
fornia cases construing statutes different from 
ours which reach a result not possible under our 
statute and which in our opinion would do violence 
to the legislative intent expressed thereiln. It may 
well be that the results this defwndant contends 
for wmtld be in the public inte1'·est lmt that is 
something which the lPg1~slature anil not this cmtrt 
must consider." 
Apparently the legislature acted upon the advice of this 
court because the 1955 legislature en::.cted ~\ new motor 
vehicle act in which Section 41-n-1-t y;a>> cmnpletely 
changed and the provision contained therein is praetically 
identic.al with the California Act as construed by the 
Supreme Court of California in the Reed ·1;s. Simpson, 
case, cited supra, so that the reasoning of this court 
to the effect that the California statutes ~.re different 
from ours no longer prevails, and hence the Jensen vs. 
Taylor case decision can no longer control and it seem~ 
to us that in view of the fact that that act "-as rhanged 
to conform to the California statute which had already 
been construed by the highest court of California is an 
impelling reason why this court should adopt the Cali-
fornia decision. 
l'Tnder the 1955 arnendment the operator of an Pmer-
gency vehicle is no longer required to :-;low down when 
entering an intersection with the lights .against him. 
Appellant asserts that the defendant "·as guilty of 
negligence as a matter of law in failing to :·we the plain-
tiff's car in the intersection. In th<? Ileed Ps. Simpson. 
case the Supreme Court of California discusses this 
matter .as follows : 
17 
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"Of course, if the decedent's conduct were 
found to be an arbitrary exercise of his traffic 
privileges, as where such driver has given a 
reasonably necessary warning but sees that it 
has not been observed or heeded and having an 
opportunity to stop, he nevertheless continues on 
into an inevitable collision, he could not be re-
lieved from negligence because the issue would 
then be akin to that involved under the last clear 
chance doctrine." 
The court then says: 
"As the record here discloses, the decedent 
was obliged to watch the erratic traffic that he 
was pursuing down the boulevard and the jury 
could well have found him free from negligence 
even though he failed to observe until too late 
defendant Simpson's car as it undertook in the 
middle of the block to turn across the oncoming 
traffic." 
The jury could well find frmn the evidence in our case 
that the defendant likewise was obliged. to perform 
several acts which would divert his attention from seeing 
the plaintiff's c.ar. He knew he was driving through the 
intersection. He was operating both the siren and the 
revolving red light. He was keeping his car under forty 
1niles per hour, which required a glance at his speedo-
meter. He knew that 'Yest bound traffic n1ight enter the 
intersection where his vision \\"a8 obstructed. He also had 
to watch South bound traffic if the light changed. Con-
fronted, therefore, with these requiren1ents, a jury might 
well conclude that he was not guilty of negligence in 
failing to see the Johnson car. In other words, we con-
tend that it hecame a question of fact for the jury's 
18 
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determination as to whether or not under all the circum-
stances he was relieved of negligence in not seeing the 
plaintiff's car in the intersection. 
POINT 4. 
We think that the court was justified in refusing 
to give plaintiff's requested instruction No. 8, for the 
following reasons : 
A. The language "it follows that in the exercise 
of ordinary care the amount of caution re-
quired by the law increa::;es as does the danger 
that reasonably should be anticipated" would 
be confusing to a jury because it would apply 
the doctrine of ordinary care as therein de-
fined to the driver of an emergency vehicle, 
notwithstanding the exemptions granted 
under the act. 
B. We think the subject was fully covered by 
the instructions as given by the court. 
C. We cannot see how plaintiff's rights were 
in any way prejudiced. 
POINT 5. 
Here again, the requested instruction X o. 11 applies 
a rule of conduct which is not applicable to an emer-
gency vehicle situation. The requested instruction says 
that the plaintiff had the right to presume that no vehicle 
would be operated against the red tratfic control light 
and that she was not required to anticipate the presence 
of a police vehicle. Certainly the driver of a vehicle 
charged with a knowledge of the law cannot presume that 
an emergency vehicle might not be operated against a 
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red light because the controlling statute gives them that 
right. Here again the requested instruction would apply 
had there been no emergency vehicle involved. Appel-
lant says (see page 36) that: 
"The section of the Utah Code can only be 
interpreted as meaning that the driver of an 
emergency vehicle does not enjoy any of the 
privileges set forth in 41-6-14 unless he sounds 
his sirens so as to give other drivers reasonable 
opportunity either to stay out of his path or to 
get out of his path." 
The evidence in this case showed without dispute 
that the plaintiff could stop her car within six feet. She, 
therefore, had ample time during which the siren was 
sounding and the light was burning to have stopped 
her car before entering the East half of "\V.ashington. 
Boulevard. 
POINT. 6. 
UNA VOIDABLE ACCIDENT 
As we understand appellant, there is no contention 
that the instruction on unavoidable accident "\\·as not a 
correct statement of the law. In fact, it is copied from· 
California Fonns No. 134. Appellant, however, contends 
that it was error for the court to instruct on unavoidable 
accident because : 
A. It was not affirmatively pleaded; and 
B. That there was no evidence justifying the 
court in giving the instruction. 
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A. While there is authority to the contrary, we 
think the great weight of authority supports our conten-
tion that unavoidable accident is not an affirmative de-
fense and need not be specially pleaded. This is definitely 
the law of the State of California. See 
Parker vs. W ormack 
230 P. 2nd 823 
Driver vs. Norman 
236 P. 2nd 6 
Faeh vs. Union Hotel 
236 P. 2nd 667 
Sherrillo vs. Stone and W estler 
244 P. 2nd 70 
Hooper vs. Bronson 
266 P. 2nd 590 
Webb vs. Hardin 
Arizona 
89 P. 2nd 30 
Seele vs. Purcell 
(New Mexico) 
113 P. 2nd 320 
Rowton vs. Kemp 
(Oklahoma) 
125 P. 2nd 1003 
Attention is also called to the fact that Rule 8-C lists af-
finnative defenses which must be pleaded and unavoid-
able accident is not listed therein, which is a clear indica-
tion that unavoidable accident is not regarded as an af-
firmative defense which must be pleaded. 
B. Assuming that an instruction on unavoidable 
accident may in a proper case be given under a general 
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denial, then the remaining question is whether or not the 
giving of this instruction constituted prejudicial error. 
Many of the cases cited supra deal with this question. In 
the Parker case, it was held that unless the defendant 
is guilty of negligence as a matter of law it is proper for 
the court to give an instruction on unavoidable accident. 
ln our opinion, the following evidence justified the court 
in giving this instruction. Defendant was accorded cer-
tain privileges while responding to an emergency call. 
As he approached the intersection both the light and the 
siren were in operation. The plaintiff, upon entering the 
intersection and proceeding Easterly, had a clear unob-
structed view of the approaching vehicle. The defend-
ant, in the exercising of his responding to an emergency 
call, was required to do a number of things prior to and 
while passing through the intersection. His attention of 
necessity could not be directed solely to East bound 
traffic. He was required to watch for West bound traf-
fic, watch his speed and observe the semaphore light to 
see whether cars might approach from the X orth upon a 
change of signal. \Ye submit that under the facts as pre-
sented and the inference which the jury was entitled to 
draw therefrom, a jury might well conclude that the 
plaintiff, upon seeing the green light, inadvertently failed 
to look to her right, failed to observe what was clearly 
to be observed and, thinking the intersection clear for 
her passage, and that, on the other hand, the defendant, 
looking to the West and seeing no c.ar approaching from 
that direction, and believing that no East bound car would 
enter the intersection ahead of him, and considering the 
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emergency statute which in effect repeals all traffic 
regulations, that a jury might well conclude the accident 
was unavoidable. 
Furthermore, we contend that the g1v1ng of this 
instruction was not prejudicial to the plaintiff. 
POINT 7. 
Did the court commit prejudicial error in giving 
an instruction on assumption of risk '1 
While it is true that the doctrine of assmnption of 
risk was at first limited to controversies between master 
and servant, it has been extended to cover other situa-
tions. In the case of, 
Wold vs. Ogden City 
258 P. 2nd 453 
this court .applied the doctrine to a situation which did 
not involve a controversy between master and servant. 
We think that most of the rnodern cases have extended 
the rule and made it applicable in all cases where there 
is evidence to justify its application. The doctrine has 
been applied in railroad crossing cases where the driver 
has tried to beat the oncoming train acrm;s the track. 
We fail to see any logical reason why the doctrine should 
not be applied in an intersection case. The question, it 
seems to us, resolves itself into this proposition: Was 
there evidence or inference deductible therefrom which 
justified the court in giving an instruction on the law 
of assumption of risk~ 
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Plaintiff called as an expert witness Officer Bennett 
who testified concerning speeds, distances travelled and 
distances within which cars could be stopped at various 
speeds. On cross examination he admitted what of course 
is obvious that if the defendant was proceeding at a 
speed of forty miles per hour K orthward for a distance 
of one hundred twenty feet and the plaintiff was pro-
ceeding Eastward at a speed of five miles per hour, 
that in order for the two cars to meet at the point' of 
contact the plaintiff's car would have to travel fifteen 
feet. He further admitted that if the plaintiff was travel-
ling at a speed of five miles per hour, she could stop 
within six feet, which also included reaction time. The 
jury could well find that plaintiff had a clear .and un-
obstructed view of the approaching car with lights burn-
ing and siren sounding when she was back at least fifteen 
feet from the point of impact; that she could have stopped 
within six feet and that she had the entire 'Vestern half 
of Washington Boulevard open and unobstructed, there 
being no Southbound traffic on Washington Boulevard. 
Clearly there w.as no danger of a collision until plaintiff 
passed into the Eastern half of Washington Boulevard. 
A jury could well conclude from this evidence that plain-
tiff atten1pted to cross through the intersection ahead 
of the oncoming vehicle and, of course, had she succeeded 
in moving a few feet further Easterly before the impact, 
there would have been no collision. 
The evidence, we think, justified the submission of 
the issue of assumption of risk to the jury. If they 
believed from the evidence that plaintiff had ample time 
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to stop before reaching the center, but instead of doing 
so, she continued on into the path of an oncoming emer-
gency vehicle, believing that she had time to cross its 
line of traffic before the car reached the point of impact, 
but that she was mistaken, either in the speed of the 
oncoming car or her own speed, a jury could well conclude 
that she thereby assumed the risk of attempting to cle.ar 
the portion of the intersection upon which the e1nergency 
vehicle was travelling before it reached the point of im-
pact. 
It must also be remembered that the plaintiff was 
unable to remember anything which had occurred as 
much as three days before the accident, so th.at the 
matter was left somewhat to inferences which the jury 
might draw from the evidence. We think, therefore, that 
the court was justified in submitting to the jury the 
issue of assumption of risk. 
Appellant, on page 45, quotes from 65 C.J.S., 851 
to 853, in which it is stated generally that in order to 
invoke the rule, it is essential that plaintiff, who exposed 
himself to danger, or who continued so to expose himself, 
shall have done so voluntarily. vV e say that the jury 
could certainly find from the evidence and the reasonable 
inferences deducible therefrom, that the plaintiff did 
voluntarily expose herself to the risk of beating the 
oncoming emergency vehicle across its pathway. 
Appellant further quotes the text to the effect that 
knowledge and appreciation of danger is also necessary 
to invoke the doctrine of assuming rjsk. If the jury could 
infer that plaintiff knew of the approachjng vehicle in 
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time to have stopped before entering the Eastern half of 
Washington Boulevard, but that she chose to continue 
forward, believing that she had ample time to cross ahead 
of the oncoming emergency vehicle, then the jury could 
well conclude that the risk or danger of so acting should 
have been known to her and appreciated by her. 
We contend that by reason of the suspension of all 
traffic rules governing drivers generally in case of an 
emergency vehicle, it of necessity does expose the travel-
ling public to inherent dangers which might be classed 
as unavoidable, but the legislature has felt that the public 
interest is better subserved by granting this immunity 
to emergency vehicles, even though it thereby exposes 
the travelling public to dangers which would not have 
been encountered but for the fact that it is an emergency 
vehicle, and, therefore, the court was justified in instruct-
ing the jury both as to unavoidable accident and assump-
tion of risk. We contend further that the giving of this 
instruction was not prejudicial. 
POINT 8. 
Appellant has attached to the transcript a statement 
hy the trial judge concerning an incident which occurred 
during the deliberation of the jury. "\Ye object to this 
eourt's consideration of this affidavit. "\Ye do not believe 
that it properly forms a p.art of the transcript. However, 
quite apart from this, the jury asked the judge to give 
thern some further instruction as to whether or not the 
dod rine of an act of God might apply. The judge tried 
to rontaet the attornt>y~ but was unable to find either 
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of them. He then went to the door of the jury ro01n 
and upon being asked that question he advised the jury 
that the doctrine of an act of God did not apply and 
reminded the jury that they must decide this case on 
the evidence presented and the instructions given them 
by the court. Shortly thereafter, the court encountered 
plaintiff's counsel and informed him of what had taken 
place. He made no objections whatsoever to the proceed-
ings. He now complains that the court should have pro-
ceeded to explain to the jury what w.as the difference 
between an act of God and unavoidable accident. He 
certainly had an opportunity to object if he had wanted 
to do so. 
He further contends that the court should have 
brought the jury back into the courtroom. He 1nade no 
such request. 
It seems to us th.at the plaintiff was perfectly willing 
to accept what had been done without any objection until 
after the verdict of the jury was returned. We do not 
believe that he now has any right to complaint after 
he has experimented with the jury's verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
Respondent sincerely believes that the case was fully 
and fairly tried; th.at the court's instructions, taken as 
a whole, were fair to both sides; that no prejudicial error 
was committed and that this case should he affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
LEROY B. YouNG, of 
YouNG, THATCHER & GLASMANN 
Attorneys at Lwr 
1018 F1irst Security Bank Bldg. 
Ogden, etah 
Attorneys for Respondent 
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